Unlimited Forms

I easily go beyond all bounds, when I have a go at it
I consume enormously
The aim is to feel things
So I go overboard, and I like
to exagerate
it irks
brave and reasonable people
who keep within the bounds

Hey this is no dream, I know
when I stop, I’ll be
Leaving Paris
I know, later I’ll pay for this*

I overstepped the bounds
Easily
Readily
Yeah, I overstep the bounds
Without problems of ethics

*refrain

I will pay for that
I’ll end up in hard labour
I’ll be breaking stones in Guyana

I overstepped the bounds
Easily
Widely
When I start I finish
My job
properly
I consume of course
the most liquids possible
and sometimes even solids
nicely plump and chubby

*refrain x3

I will then ... hand out the change this way

I am the Sea

There are men high up there fishing,
Haven't seen quite enough of the world,
I ain't seen a sign of my hero,
And I'm still diving down for pearls.


Let me flow into the ocean,
Let me get back to the sea.
Let me be stormy and let me be calm,
Let the tide in, and set me free.


I'm flowing under bridges,
Then flying through the sky,
I'm travelling down cold metal
Just a tear in baby's eye.


Let me flow into the ocean
Let me get back to the sea
Let me be stormy and let me be calm
Let the tide in, rush over me.


I am not the actor
This can't be the scene
But I am in the water,
As far as I can see...


I'm remembering distant memories
Recalling other names.
Rippling over canyons,
And boiling in the train.
May Love Reign O'er Me!

Ode to Pain

Jowett Summary of Plato's "Philebus"

What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow.

The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance.

Xenophon, "Memorabilia" (Against Paid "Professors" of Virtue aka "Sophists")

...Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged Socrates in conversation thus.

Ant. - "Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man; but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than its equivalent in gold. Hence the conclusion to which I have come, as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth a cent."

To this onslaught Socrates replied: "Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases an evil name, but supposing the same person have discerned a soul of beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice as sensible. So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the first bidder we name a sophist, as though one should say a man who prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his horse and his hounds, and another in his fighting cocks, so I too take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of old, written and bequeathed in their books, I unfold and peruse in common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship with one another."

As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master, was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by him to beauty and nobility of soul.

Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did not engage in politics himself.

Socrates replied: "I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself single- handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible fit to engage in that pursuit?"

Limbic Candymen for Hire

Poetry

He sits at the table and writes.

"With this poem you will not take power," he says.
"With these verses, you will not make revolution," he says.
"Nor with thousands of verses will you make revolution," he says.

And what's more, these verses won't make peons, teachers, or carpenters live better, eat better, or he himself eat, live better.
Not even for wooing a woman can they be used.

He won't make money with them.
He won't get into the movies for free with them.
They won't give him clothes for them.
He won't get tobaco or wine with them.

Nor parrots, nor scarves, nor boats, nor bulls, nor umbrellas will he get from them.
If it were left to them, the rain would get him wet.
He won't reach forgiveness nor grace because of them.

"With this poem you will not take power," he says.
"With these verses you will not make revolution," he says.
"Nor with thousands of verses will you make revolution," he says.

He sits at the table and writes.

Food for Worms